City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Property by Young, J.S.




City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of
Property
J.S. Young
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Young, J.S., "City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Property" (1925). Minnesota Law Review. 1533.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1533
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
CITY PLANNING AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE
OF PROPERTY
By J. S. YOUNG*
ORE than half the people of the United States live under ur-
i ban conditions. An eminent authority has said, "as go the
cities so goes the country" and has designated the city as the hope
of democracy. 1
The industrial revolution has made the modern city and be-
cause the municipality is chiefly the result of economic forces, in-
sufficient thought has been given to the city as a comfortable place
in which to live. Little attention has been given to the adequate
development of streets, parks, rapid transit, general transportation.
public buildings, restricting the height, bulk and different purposes
of varying kinds of structures to make them ad&ptable to the spe-
cific uses to which these structures must be put. The result is
that Topsy-like they were not "made" but just "growed," and in
a very hit-and-miss or haphazard way.
1. THE DEvELOPMENT OF CITY PLANNING
The confusion and consequent inconvenience and discomfort
just described have called for a thorough investigation with a view
to correcting past mistakes and to formulating plans for the pre-
vention, or at least the reduction of, similar mistakes in the future.
The result is the development of a new profession-city planning,
which, in its comprehensive sense, aims to make the city safe, con-
venient, healthful and attractive.
Ancient cities, such as Rome, were partially planned. In the
Fifteenth Century the commercial cities of Italy and Hanseatic
regions benefited by some definite plans, but it was not until the
great London fire in 1666, that a plan for the rebuilding of the
city along correct lines was formulated by Christopher Wren, a
leading architect of the day. His plan was only partially followed
owing to the objections of land-owners who did not favor the
generous amounts of land recommended for streets. In 1682 Wil-
*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
'Howe, The City the Hope of Democracy.
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liam Penn planned early Philadelphia wisely. The new capital at
Washington was planned by Pierre Charles L'Enfant, a French
military engineer, who served the colonial cause during the Revo-
lutionary War. Until 1807 New York City was simply an irregu-
lar expansion of an old Dutch town. Modern city planning both
in Europe and the United States received a great impetus from
the work of Baron Haussmann, and M. Deschamps in France 2 and
Adicks, chief biirgermeister of Frankfort-on-the-Main, in Ger-
many.'- Since 1870, the city planning movement has steadily gained
in power, especially in Europe and South America, but its progress
has been much more backward in the cities of the United States,
chiefly due to narrow and divided municipal powers, public tol-
erance of defective municipal living conditions, especially ugliness,
a mistaken notion that city planning is a matter of civic beautifica-
tion only, and finally, that it involves great outlays of money cov-
ering long periods of time, and that such expenditures cannot safe-
ly be entrusted to the average municipal politician. In spite of
this tardiness, public planning,4 especially city planning, is receiv-
ing careful attention in the United States and every state has bene-
fited by its adoption.
The division of buildings and housing in the. Department of
Commerce at Washington reports that a total of 320 municipalities
with a population of more than 24 million have adopted systematic
planning, including zoning. These municipalities range from the
city of New York with its millions, down to the smallest village.5
What is city planning? City planning has two well-defined
phases: (1) the securing of, and government control over, public
property; (2) the government control of the use of private proper-
ty. The present article will treat the first phase of the subject
and a second article, the law of zoning or restricting the use of
private property.
2. A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR PUBLIC PROPERTY
There are certain public and semi-public 1roperty and interests
in a city that must receive attention in a comprehensive plan:
(1) An adequate street system which will care for the growth.
'2 Munro, Municipal Government and Administration 76.
'Williams, Law of City Planning and Zoning 87.
'Public planning, other than city, includes town, village, neighborhood,
county, state, interstate, national, international, metropolitan, regional,
and rural. See Williams, The Law of City Planning and Zoning, ch. 1.
'Circular of Department of Commerce released March 12, 1925.
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traffic and future needs of the city; (2) a street transit system
projected and progressively adapted to the needs of a growing
city; (3) development and co6rdination of railroad and water
transportation sufficient to care for the commerce, industry and
passenger needs; (4) the placing of public buildings, (a) those
which should be centrally located for ease of access from every
part of the city, such as a civic center, postoffice, city hall, audi-
torium, courthouse and public library, (b) those which should be
scattered, such as fire and police stations, elementary schools and
branch libraries, (c) the buildings and places that by their use
require special location, such as public baths, railroad stations.
hospitals, prisons, poorhouse, garbage-disposal plants and landing
fields for flying machines; (5) a complete recreational system in-
cluding neighborhood settlements, parks, playgrounds and boule-
vards; (6) the location and facilities for an adequate system of
public utilities for an expanding city.
What legal powers are necessary to carry out a comprehensive
plan? It must be kept in mind that the city uses very different
legal powers in accomplishing the objects just stated from what it
does in zoning. Also that the successful accomplishment of these
objects presupposes a comprehensive system of zoning. That is,
the two kinds of control, as will be seen later, must be co6rdinated
and put into operation together. Each is impotent without the
other. The two taken together directly promote the general wel-
fare of the city.
3. METHODS OF SECURING PUBLIC PROPERTY
In the United States the city exercises delegated and not
reserved powers, receiving its powers from state constitutions
and statutes. Its chief powers are taxation, proprietary, eminent
domain and police. The city secures property for public pur-
poses by various methods, such as dedication, prescription, pur-
chase or agreement, and eminent domain.
(1) Dedication. Acquisition of lands by dedication is em-
ployed mostly when promoters of land sales in a new subdivision
give lands for public purposes, especially for streets, sometimes
even constructing the streets. It may be used not only for public
streets but also for public buildings, markets, sewers, parks, squares
and commons. The essential feature of dedication is that it shall
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be for the use of the public at large. Dedications are of two
kinds, namely, statutory and common law. The first must be
express, 1)ut a common law dedication may be either express or
implied. Dedication of land for a public purpose is restricted to
the owner only; a tenant for life or a term of years and an
administrator cannot dedicate.- In making a dedication the intent
of the owner is the essential element and must be manifested by
his acts and declarations." Generally speaking, acceptance on the
part of the public is necessary to complete dedication.'
(2) Prescription. Rights in land for a public use may be
acquired by prescription the same as for private use.'0 Washburn
says:
"The requisites of prescription are, the use and enjoyment
of what is claimed muft have been adverse, under a claim of right.
exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted and with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the owner of the estate in, over or out of which
the easement prescribed for is claimed, and while such owner
was able in law to assert and enforce his rights, and to resist such
adverse claim if not well founded," and "must, moreover, be of
something which one party could have granted to the other.""'
(3) Agreement or Purchase.-Dedication is frequently used
for suburban additions but in the older sections of a city the chief
method of acquiring property is by agreement or purchase. This
is frequently done in the open market. By this method the regu-
lar rules of contract are followed. Frequently private owners
demand exorbitant prices. In this event the city offers prices
fixed by its own experts and if the offer is declined, resort is
had to condemnation under eminent domain.
(4) Eminent Domain.--Eminent domain is one of the most
drastic exercises of sovereignty. All cities in the United States
have delegated power to take private property for public purposes
provided fair compensation is made. In England and France
there is no constitutional requirement of compensation. In Ger-
many there is such a requirement. There are two constitutional
limitations in the constitution of the United States and different
states, namely, public purpose and fair compensation. There are
definite proceedings for condemning and taking property under
'1 LeNis, Eminent Domain, 3rd ed. sec. 489.





"Washburn, Easements, ch. 1, sec. 4. par. 26.
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the right of eminent domain in the United States. These include:
(I) Notice of city's intention to take private property; (2) a pub-
lic hearing must be held to give opportunity for protesting; (3)
plan and notice of takings must be filed in a place provided by
law; (4) former owner must have opportunity to enter suit for
damages if he so desires; (5) experts give testimony, and amounts
allowed depend upon the judgment of the court.
There are no constitutional obstacles to a city taking land
for streets, parks, public buildings, sites, etc., as these purposes
are conceded to be public."2
4. CONTROL OVER, AND PROTECTION OF, PUBLIC PROPERTY
The control over, and protection of, public property are sub-
jects of great importance.
(1) Private Restrictions that Aid in Protecting Public Prop-
erty.-Real estate salesmen who are putting an addition on the
market sometimes interpose obstacles to city planning, but con-
siderable co6peration is being secured from them at the present
time because they realize the pecuniary advantages that come from
comprehensive planning. The real estate operator, usually acting
in his own interest for profits, frequently places restrictions upon
the purchaser in the deed of conveyance. These operate as pro-
tections to public as well as private property. They include such
kinds of business as are classified as nuisances, regulations as to
barns and garages, fences, walls, set-backs, etc. Sometimes they
extend to approval of 'plans and specifications of buildings, and
locations and grading plans. They usually run for twenty-five
years. are haphazard, spasmodic, difficult to enforce, and often-
times not intelligent. In a word, they cannot be depended upon
to carry out a comprehensive city plan.
(2) Advertising on Public Property.-If the streets, parks
and public buildings are located and constructed, the city has
power to protect them against disfigurement, improper use, and
can regulate as well as prevent all forms of advertising. Since
a park is "a piece of ground enclosed for purposes of pleasure,
exercise, amusement or ornament,"' 3 a park commissioner whose
statutory duty it is "to maintain the beauty and utility of all such
"A different phase of taking for public purposes will be treated later.
See p. 526.
"Perrin v. New York Cent. R. Co., (1867) 36 N. Y. 120.
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parks, squal -.. ,oid public places as are situated within his juris-
diction," i. tito authority to allow advertisements on a park fence,
since this amuunts to perversion of the property of the park.14 In
the case of .wNainara v. Willcox'5 it was held that a city has
no power to grant a right to exhibit advertisements upon a fence
enclosing a public building. City authorities will not be restrained
from tearing down billboards or signs on sheds erected over side-
walks."6
Outdoor advertising may be on public property or on private
property so located as to be visible from the public property. The
first is usually found on the stations and vehicles of transporta-
tion companies. If the city owns the fee of the streets used by
these companies, public control is complete for two reasons: (1)
the franchise to engage in the business of public transportation
does not include the right to sell advertising space; (2) no cor-
poration or other person may advertise on public property without
public permission. Advertising on private property that impairs
public property is more difficult to control. It is not feasible to
use either the police power or eminent domain; but a system of
graduated taxation might be used both for raising revenue and
for regulation.
(3) Requlating Parks and Street Uses.-The city may desig-
nate the kinds of traffic allowed on certain streets and boulevards
and in public parks. It can exclude heavy traffic from parks
and certain streets reserving them for pleasure driving and light
vehicles. In Brodbine v. Inhabitants of Revere,'7 Knowlton, C.
J. said:
"A regulation made by the metropolitan park commissioner
forbidding the driving of a wagon or other vehicle from carrying
heavy merchandise or other articles along parkways is not void
as unreasonable and oppressive."
Again, the supreme court of Illinois has said :'1
"There is nothing unreasonable in excluding traffic teams
from a street designated and intended to be a pleasure drive. Such
a driveway must be constructed and paved in a particular man-
ner; and if heavy teaming is allowed injury would result and
frequent repairing would be necessary."
1 Thompkins v. Pallas, (1905) 47 Misc. 309, 95 N. Y. S. 875.
'(1902) 73 App. Div. 451, 77 N. Y. S. 294.
'Sullivan Advertising Co. v. New York, (1908) 61 Misc. 425. 113N. Y. S. 893.
'7(1903) 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 607.
"Cicero Lumber Co. v. The Town of Cicero, (1898) 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E.
758, 42 L. R. A. 696, 68 A. S. R. 55.
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Continuing, the court said:
"Neither can it be said that pleasure and recreation are not
as much for the good of the people as business and traffic."
Also "that an act which limits the use of streets to the purpose of
pleasure driving, is in no sense class legislation."
The holding of this case is that converting a street from heavy
traffic use to pleasure only, does not deprive former users of their
property without due process of law. In the case of the Fifth
Avenue Coach Company v. City of New York10 the court of ap-
peals said that a city which owns the fee of a street holds the
same in trust for public purposes. It may grant rights therein
which do not impair the public easement or may refrain from
granting them as it sees fit for the public convenience. Continu-
ing, the court said that the city could prevent the coach company
from carrying gaudy tobacco advertisements on the exterior of
its coaches when its franchise was for carrying passengers, only.
This decision rests on the ground that the city owns the fee and
therefore has the power to prevent heavy traffic especially with
vans or vehicles that carry exaggerated advertising, because such
advertising would attract crowds and cause congestion.
(4) Franchises of Public Utility Corporations.-One of the
best ways of protecting public property in carrying out a compre-
hensive city plan is the power of the government in the granting
of iranchises to public utility corporations."0  Public utility is a
terin used to designate a service such as the furnishing of gas,
water, electricity, heat, power, transportation, etc. The service
ret. nired cannot safely be left to private individuals but is usually
gr,.nted to public utility corporations whose business is said to be
affected with a public interest and therefore subject to public
control.21 The chief methods of controlling public utility corpora-
tions in harrnony with city planning are: (a) the conditions that
may be incorporated for securing the charter; (b) requirements
for amending the charter; (c)- regulating rates and services; (d)
granting a charter to a competing corporation; (e) by the city
9(1909) 194 N. Y. 19, 86 N. E. 824. For other cases on various phases
of this subject see Commonwealth v. McCafferty, (1888) 145 Mass. 384, 14
N. E. 451; State v. WNightman, (1905) 78 Conn. 86, 61 AtI. 56; Salisbury
v. Herchenroder, (1871) 106 Mass. 458, 8 Am. Rep. 354; Ivins v. Trenton,
(1902) 68 N. J. L. 501, 53 Atl. 202; State v. Higgs, (1900) 126 N. C. 1014,
35 S. E. 473, 48 L. R. A. 446.
"See Williams, op. cit., chap. IV; John Nolen, City Planning. pp.
66-69; 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations. 5th ed.. ch. XXV and sec. 1304,
et seq.; 4 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, chs. 34-35.
"See 'Mnnn v. Illinois. (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
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itself competing; (f) by taking over the rights and property of
the corporation and itself furnishing the utility, that is, the city
superseding the public utility corporation. These public utility
corporations bear such an intimate relation to the development
of a city that if so minded they can wreck the best city plan if
not publicly controlled. This is especially true of the transporta-
tion corporation, because the city is more dependent upon it than
upon any other utility corporation.
The methods of control just outlined apply particularly to
the transportation corporation. Those furnishing transportation
must do it under the corporate form. The power to grant and
amend charters comes from the state. This carries with it public
requirements as to the conditions in accordance with which the
business must be conducted, such as location of route, kind of
tracks and crossings, kind of cars, frequency of service, fair rates,
etc. No additional privileges may be granted the corporation
except by public authorities. These additions may be based upon
compliance with public plans and demands. It was early decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States that a charter is a
contract 22 and cannot be impaired. In accordance with a sugges-
tion made by Justice Story at the time the Dartmouth College
Case was decided, there is now frequently inserted in the charter,
a reservation of the right to alter or amend the charter or to pur-
chase and recover the business. When these reservations are
inserted they become a part of the contract. An additional con-
tinuing control is exercised under the police power which cannot
be granted away in a charter.2 3
The city control over rates and facilities bears an important
relation to the city plan, especially the prevention of congestion
and the building up of localities such as suburbs. Stockholders
in public utility corporations are not entitled to unreasonably high
dividends. On the other hand, the city cannot fix rates that are
confiscatory as these would conflict with the state constitutions and
the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. A flat rate
for the whole city, and service at cost are now much favored.
Rates might fluctuate but dividends would remain fixed. A flat
'Dartmouth College v. Woodward. (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 4 L.
Ed. 629; 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations. sec. 1306 and cases cited.
'For modifications of the doctrine of the Dartmouth College Case see
Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, (1877) 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. Ed. 989; Stone
v. Mississippi, (1879) 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079. See 4 McQuillan,
op. cit., secs. 1677-1685.
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rate is supposed to prevent congestion24 and materially assist in
developing a comprehensive plan. A transportation charter is
usually supposed to be monopolistic, but if the city becomes dis-
satisfied with the service and rates of an existing corporation, it
may usually grant a franchise to a competing company or may
enter into competition by itself furnishing the utility under a
reservation to purchase or, under eminent domain, take the fran-
chise and property and furnish the utility itself or lease it under
stringent operating conditions. There are decided objections to
these'plans. If a competing corporation be allowed to enter the
field each company has the right to earn a fair return on its
investment and the public pays for the duplication. If the city
competes or takes over the service and loss results through ineffi-
ciency, then general taxation must bear the burden. The single
system under a private corporation with the public interest safe-
guarded in a franchise is favored by most authorities on the sub-
ject.-5 Other public utility corporations that use the city streets
may be controlled and made to conform to a city plan if the city
will use the legal powers it now possesses. Its power is complete.
(5) Eminent Domnain.-The most generally used, and the
most effective method of protecting public property is eminent
domain. The various phases of eminent domain employed are
condemnation of easements on the height of structures bordering
on streets, boulevards and parks; also building lines or setbacks;
and finally, zone and excess condemnation.(A) Height.--In 1898 Massachusetts passed a statute limit-
ing, with compensation, the height of private buildings around
Copley Square in Boston. In upholding the constitutionality of
this exercise of eminent domain the supreme court of Massachu-
setts in the case of Attorney-General v. Williams2 said:
"Looking to all its provisions in connection with the place to
which they apply, it seems to have been intended as a taking of
'For an opposing view, see Walter Jackson on Zone Fares for Street
Railways, in National Municipal Review, Nov. 1920, p. 705.
'See Delos F. Wilcox, Municipal Franchises, McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
New York City, 1910.
'*(1899) 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77. For other cases see Shoemaker
v. United States, (1893) 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. Ed. 170. 13 S. C. R. 361;
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., (1896) 160 U. S. 668, 40
L. Ed. 576, 16 S. C. R. 427; Bunyan v. Commissioners of Palisades Inter-
state Park, (1915) 167 App. Div. 457, 153 N. Y. S. 622; Cascade Town Co.
v. Empire Water and Power Co., (.1910) 181 Fed. 1011.
Protection of public property from the standpoint of beautification is
treated in 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain 2nd ed.. p. 162; 4 McQuillan, Munici-
pal Corporations, sec. 1485; Notes in 34 L. R. A. 998.
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rights in property for the benefit of the public who use Copley
Square. It adds to the public rights in light and air and in the
view over adjacent land above the line to which buildings may
be erected. These rights are in the nature of an easement created
by the statute and annexed to the park. Ample provision is made
for compensation to the owners of the servient estates. In all
respects the statute is in accordance with the laws regulating the
taking the property by right of eminent domain, if the legislature
properly could determine that the preservation or improvement of
the park in this particular was for a public use. The uses which
should be deemed public in reference to the right of the legisla-
ture to compel an individual to part with his property for a com-
pensation, and to authorize or direct taxation to pay for it, are
being enlarged and extended with the progress of the people in
education and refinement. Many things which a century ago were
luxuries or were altogether unknown, have now become neces-
saries. . . The grounds on which public parks are desired are vari-
ous. They are to be enjoyed by the people who use them. They
are expected to minister, not only to the grosser senses, but also
to the love of the beautiful in nature in the varied forms which the
changing seasons bring. Their value is enhanced by such touches
of art as help to produce pleasing and satisfactory effects on the
emotional and spiritual side of our nature. Their influence should
be uplifting and, in the highest sense, educational. If wisely
planned and properly cared for they promote the mental as well
as the physical health of the people. For this reason it has always
been deemed proper to expend money in the care and adornment
of them to make them beautiful and enjoyable. Their aesthetic
effect never has been thought unworthy of careful consideration
by those best qualified to appreciate it. It hardly would be contended
that the same reasons which justify the taking of land for a
public park do not also justify the expenditure of money to make
the park attractive and educational to those whose tastes are
being formed and whose love of beauty is being cultivated."
"If the legislature, for the benefit of the public, was seeking to
promote the beauty and attractiveness of a public park in the capital
of the Commonwealth and to prevent unreasonable encroachments
upon the light and air which it had previously received, we cannot
say that the law-making power might not determine that this was
a matter of such public interest as to call for the expenditure of
public money and to justify the taking of private property."
There are statutes limiting, with compensation, the height of
buildings in the neighborhood of the statehouse in Boston, the
state capitol at Hartford, Connecticut, and the courthouse in New
York City. The city of St. Louis has provided for a condemna-
tion of structures fronting on public parks.2 7
'Williams, op. cit. p. 387.
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(B) Building Lines or Set-backs.-What is a setback? It is
a front building line behind the street line beyond which an abutter
cannot erect buildings, but may use his land for all other pur-
poses.28 By the establishment of such a line the city condemns,
under the right of eminent domain, and pays the abutter the value
of the building line easement. Under some ordinances nothing
can be built beyond this line. Frequently, to save expense, build-
ings in advance of the establishment of the building line. are
allowed to remain but not to be renewed or substantially repaired
and are finally condemned when they are few or of small value.
The building line has for its main purposes (1) the securing
of privacy; (2) improving the general appearance of the street as
a whole; (3) imparting a general air of spaciousness; (4) in-
creasing the amount of greenery; (5) economizing when the street
must be widened or its use changed.2 9 The building line may be
employed to advantage in three classes of streets, namely, suburban
and minor residential streets, suburban business and traffic
streets, and central business and traffic streets.3 0
The setback is a. distinct advantage to the suburban and minor
residential street as it allows lawns in front of buildings, decreases
or prevents congestion and increases light and air for the com-
munity as a whole, raises and stabilizes land values and makes the
district more quiet, pleasant and healthful for residences. Some-
times these setbacks result from private covenants in deeds or
tacit agreement on the part of individual builders or owners of
homes, but private covenants expire and tacit agreements are often
ignored or violated by private owners. The safe way is to estab-
lish and enforce the setback by public authority.31
This is an age characterized by the rapid growth of cities and
this carries with it an intensive employment of land, due in any
locality either to an increase in the same use, or a shift to a more
intensive use. This throws an increased burden upon streets in the
suburbs and partially settled sections and wise flexible forms of
street construction can be adopted. In laying out a new street a
city may at the beginning take land wide enough for future needs
and allow the abutter on each side to use strips for narrow lawns,
or it may lay out the street broad enough for present uses and
impose a setback on abutters so that it will not be necessary to pay
'Ibid. p. 177.
' Iohn Nolen, op. cit., p. 101.
"Williams. op. cit., p. 178.
"Supra 522.
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for buildings when the street is widened. . Either course reduces
city waste, avoids useless expenses for the destruction of buildings
and allows the abutters the use of additional strips for some time.
3 2
As the residence street changes to one of stores and apartment
houses, the setbacks, especially at corners, tend to reduce collisions
in this age of automobiles. The widening of traffic streets in the
central business section, after the street is intensively improved
with buildings, is sometimes imperative and usually enormously
expensive. The buildings frequently cost more than the land.
Great saving can be made by establishing a building line back
of the street line and of the fronts of buildings, under the provi-
sions of which the buildings that are in advance of the building
line may not be renewed or substantially repaired. The city can
then take these old buildings when their value becomes small.-
This is a slow but economical method of street widening.
The constitutionality of a setback is questioned under the
police power,33 but is unquestioned under the power of eminent
domain. Under the latter the interest in the extra land is con-
demned for a street use. The legislature has decided to take an
easement in land instead of the title and the legislature is the judge
of which to take.
C. Zoning and Excess Condenation.-These two forms of
condemnation are enlarged and liberal exercises of the power of
eminent domain. They are new as applied to eminent domain and
are being urged as proper methods of broadening the law to meet
the needs of city planning. Their emergence is due to an early,
narrow, visionless conception of the complete purposes of eminent
domain.
Zoning condemnation is the taking, with compensation, of an
entire district. It is complete and independent for a special pur-
pose and is sometimes used in the built-up parts of a city, espe-
cially to eliminate slums. When a district is selected for condem-
nation, all the land, including buildings, is condemned, the build-
ings destroyed and the land thrown in to a common mass. The
land for public uses is withdrawn and the remainder is replanned
and re-subdivided and the part intended for private uses resold.
'See pamphlet, Establishment of Setbacks or Courtyards in City of
New York, issued in 1917.
"See St. Louis v. Hill, (1893) 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861; Fruth v.
Board of Affairs, (1915) 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. E. 105. For an opposing
view see Eubank v. Richmond, (1916) 110 Va. 749, 63 S. E. 376; (1912)
226 U. S. 137, 57 L. Ed. 156, 33 S. C. R. 76.
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This must be done under the power of eminent domain and not
under the police power, because the cost is too great to be borne by
private owners."'
A few states have passed statutes authorizing cities, for the
purpose of raising the level of low land and securing proper drain-
age, to condemn, reconstruct and resell an entire district. Massa-
chusetts in 186735 authorized the city of Boston to condemn, re-
plan and resell the Back Bay district, which was done very suc-
cessfully. This district is the best residential section of Boston at
present. The statute was upheld as constitutional by both the
supreme court of Massachusetts and the Supreme Court of -the
United States. 36 In sustaining the constitutionality of the statute,
the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"In determining whether the legislature, in a particular enact-
ment, has passed the limits of its constitutional authority, every
reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the validity
of such enactment. It must be regarded as valid, unless it can be
clearly shown to be in conflict with the constitution. It is a well-
settled rule of constitutional exposition, that if a statute may or
may not be, according to circumstances, within the limits of legisla-
tive authority, the existence of the circumstances necessary to sup-
port it must be presumed. 37
"In Dengley v. Boston . . . it was objected, that as the act
(of 1867) authorized the city to first take the land and thereby
transfer to itself the fee without the consent of the owners, and as
the only object of the legislature was to abate a nuisance, the act
should only have granted power to occupy the land until its object
was effected by raising the grade, which being done, the land should
have been restored to the owners, applying the benefit received
therefrom in offset to the damages. That objection was fully met.
Conceding it to be true that the raising of the grade did notrequire
the occupation of the Lind for a great length of time, and that when
the work was completed the nuisance was abated, and the land in a
condition to be occupied by private persons, the court said: 'But
its condition will be greatly changed; almost as much as raising
flats into upland. The former surface will be deeply buried under
the earth that will have to be brought upon it, and the changed
condition is to be-perpetual. If the old property is restored, the
new property which has been annexed to it must go with it. This
"See Williams op. cit. p. 61.
'Mass., Laws 1867, Chap. 308; supplementary laws are 1908, ch. 117
and 1910, ch. 606.
'Dengley v. Boston, (1868) 100 Mass. 594; Sweet v. Rechel, (1895)
159 U. S. 380, 40 L. Ed. 188, 16 S. C. R. 43.
'Citing Talbot v. Hudson. (1860) 16 Gray (Mass.) 417; Fletcher v.
Peck, (1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, 3 L. Ed. 162; Sinking Fund Cases,(1878) 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. Ed. 496.
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would be very unjust to the city, which has been compelled to incur
the great expense of destroying the nuisance, unless the owner
were required to make a reasonable compensation, which might be
far beyond the amount of the damages to which he would be
entitled. It would be difficult to adjust the matter; and in many
cases it might operate harshly upon the owner to compel him to
take and pay for the improvements. On the whole, therefore, the
plan of compelling the city to take the land in fee simple, and the
owner to part with his whole title for a just compensation, would
seem to be the most simple and equitable that could be adopted;
unless there is some objection on the ground that a fee simple is
more sacred than an estate for life or years, or than an easement
of greater or less duration. We can see no ground for regarding
one of these titles as more sacred than another, or for regarding
land as more sacred than personal property. . . It must. . . be left
to the legislature to decide what quantity of estate ought to be
taken in order to accomplish its purpose, and do the most complete
justice to all parties. . .The Constitution provides for the pro-
tection of all private property, and it provides that when the pub-
lic exigencies require that the property of any individual shall be
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compen-
sation therefor. But it leaves the legislature, without any restric-
tion, express or implied, to decide in each case as it arises, what
constitutes such exigency; and, if the land is to be taken, what
estate in it shall pass."
Excess condemnation," in essence, is taking more property
than is necessary for the precise, narrow purpose of the public im-
provement, using the excess property so taken in any way that is
conducive to the public interest, or selling it for private use, usual-
ly subject to restrictions calculated to promote the larger purpose
of the main improvement; in brief, it is incidental to another and
main condemnation.39
This method of condemnation had its first trial in the United
States. It was used in New York in 1812; Charleston, South
Carolina, in 1817; Pennsylvania in 1868; New Jersey in 1870.40
These early laws were little used for the reason that they were
promptly declared unconstitutional on the ground that the taking
was not for a public purpose. The recent interest in city planning
"For good treatments of this subject see Cushman, Excess Condemna-
tion (Appleton, 1917) ; Fisher, Plan of Chicago, (1909) ; Report of Chicago
Bureau of Efficiency, Excess Condemnation, (1918) ; Swan, Excess Con-
demnation, Report for Committee on Taxation, City of New York; H. W.
Crawford, Constitutionality of Excess Condemnation; Senate Document
No. 422, 61st Cong., 2nd Session; Williams, op. cit. chaps. II ind III.
'If this form of condemnation were regarded as incidental, one of the
main objections to its constitutionality would disappear. See discussion
of constitutionality, infra, p. 539.
"'See Williams, op. cit. p. 128.
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has shown a decided need for the revival of the practice. This
method of taking private property has had extended and success-
ful use in other countries. The city of London was granted the
power in 1845; Brussels in 1867; and it was used by the city of
Paris from 1852 to 1869, when many of the beautiful thorough-
fares were built. It has been used with signal success by such
Canadian cities as .Montreal, Halifax and Toronto. Because of
early unfriendly decisions of the courts in the United States, little
was done with it until Massachusetts passed the Remnants Act in
1904, which pernfitted municipalities in making public improve-
ments to take title to any remnants left which in themselves were
unsuitable for building sites. Other states quickly followed the
example of Massachusetts. Among these states were Ohio, Vir-
ginia, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Wisconsin, and New
York. Statutory regulation under the constitutions as they then
stood was found to be inadequate because of the narrow construc-
tion placed upon them by the courts. The next step was to broaden
the power by amendments to the state constitutions. Massachu-
setts adopted the first constitutional amendment in 1911 and it
was followed by amendments in Wisconsin and Ohio, in 1912;
New York in 1913 and Rhode Island in 1916.41
Excess condemnation is most frequently used for cutting a
new street or widening an old one, but it may be used to carry
out almost any public improvement such as a municipal building,
playgrounds and public parks. But regardless of the kind of im-
provement to be added, some of the following results may be ex-
pected. First, the adjoining land is almost sure to increase in
value. This increased value is produced by the city's improve-
ment and not by the local land-owner. The construction of the
street and the taking of the extra land to resell'should be regarded
as one business enterprise. If the city does not get the increment
of the value and apply it to the making of the improvement the cost
will be increased. None of the statutes or constitutional amend-
ments mentioned above expressely authorizes the condemnation
for the making of profit, but all of them provide for re-sale.
Therefore, profit may, and usually does, result. This is not the
chief object. It is merely incidental, or as a manufacturer would
say, it is the utilization of waste or a by-product.4 2 Secondly, the
'See Report of Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, op. cit. p. 51.
'In addition to excess condemnation, there are other methods of ap-
propriating the increment of value resulting from the improvement. The
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cutting of a street, especially if it be diagonal, always leaves rem-
nants on each side of it not large enough for independent improve-
ment. These remnants shut off the land back of them from the
street and prevent development. The result is that values shrink
and the city loses revenue from local assessments and general taxes.
A third effect may be that the use to which the adjacent land is put,
may defeat the objects of the public improvement, or at least im-
pair these objects because the street may be bordered by a row of
cheap unsightly houses, a solid row of tall buildings, or buildings
at wrong points.
The public improvement may be protected if the city con-
demns the land and resells with covenants against improper uses
of the land. The chief object of excess condemnation should be
the protection of the main improvement. In the statutes and amend-
ments mentioned above, some provide that the resale may be
"with," others, "with or without restrictions" to secure the accom-
plishment of the improvement. The writer is strongly of the
opinion that the law should read, "with restrictions" in the cove-
nants of resale to protect the main public improvement. 3 Such a
provision strengthens the condemnation if it is dontested in the
courts.
The bad effects of allowing a city to condemn for a street
widening purpose, precisely so much land as is needed for the spe-
cific improvement and no more may now be shown. In the proposed
diagonal Ogden Avenue extension44 in the city of Chicago, if car-
ried out as planned, there will be a hang-over of 93 remnants with
a frontage of 3,300 feet on the proposed new street that will be
too small or too irregular in shape to be available for building pur-
poses. Further, in widening Twelfth street in Chicago the city left
a strip of land three feet wide and 166 feet long in the hands of
the private owners, and when Chicago improved Michigan Avenue,
there were lot areas with a frontage of 617 feet having varying
depths of from five to fourteen feet. Unless these are united to
adjoining property which may take years, the land will remain
vacant or be used for billboards, small one-story shops or other
make-shift structures--each one an eye-sore. Many of the lot
remnants along street improvements in New York city have re-
common method in this country is to levy local assessments up to the cost
of the improvement. It may be accomplished by an increment tax, in gen-
eral use in several foreign countries.
'For a different view see Williams. op. cit. p. 130.
"See Report of Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, passim.
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mained vacant for from twenty to fifty years because they were
unfit for building sites and no union of the remnants with the
adjoining property was accomplished.
When remnants are left it becomes essential, if the improve-
ment is to be protected, that they be united with adjoining prop-
erty under a single ownership so that the combined lots can be
made suitable for building sites. If this is .not done the results
,that may follow are strikingly set forth by H. S. Swan in a report
on excess condemnation for the Committee on Taxation of the
city of New York as follows:
"Since each parcel, by the mere fact of its adjacence, com-
mands the values of the neighboring plots, every owner becomes,
as it were, a monopolist. Knowing the strategic position of his
own remnant and that its union with any other would immediately,
without any effort on his own part, result in a greater value than
the sum of the two separately, each proprietor overestimates the
true importance of his own plot and shrewdly bargains to get not
only the proportion that his own parcel contributes to this increased
value, but also as much more as he is able to wring from the
purchaser. Not succeeding in his designs by legitimate means, the
owner, if he be. unscrupulous, sometimes erects so objectionable
a building on his land or puts the land to such a use as practically
coerces the adjoining owner into either purchasing it at an exorbi-
tant price or selling his own at a great sacrifice. The limited
power of eminent domain, heretofore existing, has often served
to make the ultimate development of the city dependent upon petty
jugglery."
Excess condemnation would empower the city to acquire the
remnant and unite it with adjoining property, thus forming lots
suitable for building sites; prevent black-mailing and speculative
profits; exclude the building of objectionable structures, or leav-
ing remnants as unsightly vacant areas; reduce litigation expenses;
improve sanitary conditions; and permit the city a recoupment
from re-sales of the property condemned.
What should the city condemn? The condemnation should
extend not only to the remnant but also to a sufficient amount of
the adjacent land to permit the making of suitable building sites
out of the re-arranged tracts. Only in this way can the remnant
be eliminated and the united tracts of land be given a frontage on
the widened street. This will accomplish the main object of the
improvement.
The writer is fully convinced that the condemnation should
not stop with taking a mere easement for a public use, but should
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give the city the absolute fee to the property condemned. There
are two reasons for this opinion: (1) If the city wishes to change
the use for which the easement is taken, the property reverts to
the original owner or his heirs, if they can be found. The city
should control the property in fee as an asset so if can change the
use or sell the property; (2) while an easement would be less
expensive than full title and for some purposes would be effective,
nevertheless it is open to the same objections as is the exercise of
the police power. In the main it would provide only a negative
means of control, that is, it could prevent the property from being
put to an offensive or injurious use, but it could not furnish a posi-
tive or constructive means for developing street surroundings, and
the street together; therefore the city should acquire the fee to be
in a position to carry out a comprehensive city plan.
The final topic for consideration in this article is the consti-
tutionality of excess condemnation. This will involve the examina-
tion of several decisions of the courts.
The constitutionality of excess condemnation has been raised
in state cases only; however, some decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States have a bearing on the subject. The attitude
of the Supreme Court of the United States is significant because
the constitutionality of excess condemnation may be attacked as a
violation of the fourteenth amendment despite the fact that the
state supreme courts may hold it in harmony with the state con-
stitutions. That is, a federal question is involved.
The state decisions are not numerous and far from harmoni-
ous. Since they deal with the subject of eminent domain it may
be permissible to take a cursory view of this subject. Eminent
domain finds a place in every state constitution, also the fifth
amendment of the constitution of the United States and the "due
process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. The constitutional
limitations are that private property may be taken for a public
purpose when just compensation is made to the owner. The
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Conipany v. Chicago,45 decided
that taking private property for a private purpose is not due
process of law since private property can be taken for a public use
only. The question arises. what is a public use? The answer must
be found in the adjudicated cases .4  There is no general agreement
'(1896) 166 U. S. 226, 51 L. Ed..979. 17 S. C. R. 581.
'Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3d ed., sec. 251 and cases cited.
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found in the decisions. In the case of the Dayton Mining Com-
pany v. Sewell4 the court said:
"No question has ever been submitted to the courts upon
which there is a greater variety and conflict of reasoning and re-
sults than that presented as to the meaning of the words 'public
use,' as found in the different state constitutions regulating the
right of eminent domain."
The term "public use" is one of those general constitutional
phrases like "the law of the land" and "due process" that has no
clear-cut meaning either by definition or context in the constitu-
tions. These phrases have been the footballs of judicial inclusion
and exclusion as a necessity for applying them to concrete issues
has arisen from time to time. Lewis, an eminent authority, says :48
"The different views which have been taken of the words,
'public use' resolve themselves into two classes: one holding that
there must be a use, or a right of use, on the part of the public or
some limited portion of it; the other holding that they are equiva-
lent to public benefit, utility or advantage."
He favors the first meaning for the following reasons :49
"First, That it accords with the primary and more commonly
understood meaning of the words; second, it accords with the gen-
eral practice in regard to taking private property for public use in
vogue when the phrase was first brought into use in the earlier
constitutions; third, it is the only view which gives the words any
force as a limitation or renders them capable of any definite and
practical application."
The second view has the support of several state supreme
courts and also the Supreme Court of the United States as will be
seen later.50
With these two standards of meaning in mind, the few cases
that have a bearing on excess condemnation will now be examined.
A statute passed by the state of'South Carolina conferred power
upon the city of Charleston to condemn remnants in connection
with the widening of a street. The constitutionality of the act
was challenged in the case of Dann v. The City of Charleston.5 '
The court saia:
"The question involved is whether the legislature has the con-
stitutional right of taking the property of one individual and trans-
ferring it to another or to a body corporate for their own indi-
vidual benefit and emolument."
'(1876) 11 Nev. 394.
'Lewis, op. cit. sec. 257.
'Ibid, sec. 258.
'Infra, p. 539.
"(1824) Harper's Law (S.C.) 189.
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Continuing, the court said:
"Any act of partial legislation, which operates oppressively
upon one individual, in which the community has no interest, is not
the law of the land. . To take the property of one man, and
give it to another, would be contrary to all those immutable princi-
ples of justice and common law, which have been consecrated by
universal consent from time immemorial, and which are secured
to us by the plain and unequivocal language of the constitution.
Such would be the effect of the act in question.'?
This decision was handed down in 1824. If it were decided
today the act would be declared unconstitutional on the ground that
it is not due process of law.
In 1834 a "remnants" case came before the highest court of
New York. This was the case of The Matter of Albany Street.52
in denying the power of excess condemnation the court adopted
the narrow view of public use and said:
"The constitution, by authorizing the appropriation of private
property to public use, impliedly declares, that for any other use,
private property shall not be taken from one and applied to the
use of another. It is in violation of natural right, and if it is not
in violation of the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and
cannot be supported. This power has been supposed to be con-
venient, when the greater part of a lot is taken, and only a small
part is left, not required for public use, and that small part of but
little value in the hands of the owner. . . The quantity of the
residue of any lot cannot vary the principle. The owner may be
very unwilling to part with only a few feet; and I hold it equally
incompetent for the legislature thus to dispose of private property,
whether feet or acres are the subject of this assumed power. I am
clearly of opinion that the commissioners have no right to take
the strip of land in question against the consent of the corporation
of Trinity Church."
The subject was given a broader turn. In 1910 the legisla-
ture of Massachusetts asked the supreme court of that state if it
would be constitutional to authorize the city of Boston to lay out
a broad thoroughfare and take not only the land needed for the
street but also additional land with a view to selling it to private
individuals. The court53 answered the question in the negative.
In considering the question whether the land outside the thorough-
fare would be taken for a public use the court said:
"It is plain that a use of the property .to obtain the possible
income or profit that might accrue to the city from the ownership
and control of it would not be a public use. . . It is equally true
'(1834) 11 Wend. (N.Y.) 149.
"Opinions of the Justices, (1910) 204 Mass. 405. 91 N. E. 405.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and indubitable that a management and use of such property to
promote the interests of merchants or traders who might occupy
it, and to furnish better facilities for doing business and making
profits, would not be a public but a private use of the real estate."
The court then concluded its opinion with the following state-
ment:
"An affirmative answer to this question would make it possi-
ble for the city to take the home of a resident near the line of the
thoroughfare, or the shop of a humble tradesman, and compel him
to give up his property and go elsewhere, for no other reason than -
that, in the opinion of the authorities of the city, some other use
of the land would be more profitable. and therefore would better
promote the prosperity of the citizens generally. We know of no
case in which the exercise of the right of eminent domain or the.
expenditure of public money has been justified on such grounds."54
In 1907 the state of Pennsylvania passed an act providing that
cities might condemn land within 200 feet of a park or street and
sell the surplus land to private parties. Philadelphia condemned
land adjacent to the new Fairmont Park. The constitutionality
of the ordinance was upheld by the district court,35 and on appeal
denied by the state supreme court. 56  In arriving at the narrow
view of eminent domain the court said:
"\Ve think this interpretation of the words 'public use' is in
accord with their plain and natural signification and the weight of
the best considered authorities. It furnishes a certain guide to the
legislature as well as to the courts in appropriating private property
for public use. It enables the state and the owner to determine
directly their respective rights in the latter's property. If, how-
ever, public benefit, utility or advantage is to be the test of a public
use then, as suggested by the authorities, the right to condemn the
property will not depend on a fixed standard by which the legisla-
tive and judicial departments of the government are to be guided,
but upon the views of those who at the time are to determine the
question. There will be no limit to the power of either the legisla-
ture or the courts to appropriate private property to public use,
except their individual opinions as to what is and what is not for
the public advantage and utility. If such considerations are to pre-
S'The supreme court of 'Massachusetts has rendered opinions on some-
what analogous cases touching, the limitations of eminent domain. Salis-
bury Land Improvement Company v. Commonwealth, (1913) 215 Mass.
371, 103 N. E. 619; denying the power to condemn land for workmen's
cottages, see Opinions of Justices; (1912) 211 Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611; see
Duke Bond v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al., (1911)
116 Md. 683, 82 Atl. 978.
'See Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia, (1913) 22 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 195.
='Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia, (1913) 242
Pa. St. 47, 88 Atl. 904.
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vail, the constitutional guarantees as to private property will be
of small moment."
The proponents of excess condemnation will find some com-
fort in a few decisions. In 1904 Massachusetts passed a Remnants
Act which provided for condemnation when the remnants were
unsuited for the erection of suitable and appropriate buildings.
The supreme court57 of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality
of the act but intimated that it went to the verge of constitution-
ality. The reasoning of the court is as follows: The principle
herein approved is that a remnant may be taken and resold if it
is fairly incidental and reasonably necessary in connection with
the taking of the main improvement. This is an opinion and not
a decision of a case but it evidently expresses the matured judg-
ment of the court.
The supporters of excess condemnation may derive consid-
erable encouragement from the decisions of several Western states
and their affirmation by the Supreme Court of the United States.
These decisions adopt the second or recent meaning of "public
use," namely, public utility, advantage, or what is productive of
public benefit.
The supreme court of Idaho used language in the case of
Potlach Lumber Company v. Peterson5 s which supports the broad
view of public use as follows:
"It is enough if the taking tends to enlarge the resources, in-
crease the industrial energies and promote the productive power of
any considerable part of the inhabitants of a section of the state,
or leads to the growth o-f towns and the creation of new channels
for the employment of private capital and labor, as such results
indirectly contribute to the general prosperity of the whole com-
munity."
A statute of Utah providing for an aerial tramway two miles
long from a mine to a railroad for the transportation of ore, was
sustained as a public use by the supreme court of that state59 and
in affirming this decision the Supreme Court of the United State,
in the case of Stricklcy v. The Highland Boy Gold Mining Com-
pany said :60
"In the opinion of the legislature and the supreme court of
Utah the public welfare of that state demands that aerial lines be-
'Opinions of the Justices, (1910) 204 Mass. 616, 91 N. E. 578.
'(1906) 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pac. 426, 18 A. S. R. 233.
"Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley, (1904) 28 Utah 215, 78
Pac. 296, 107 A. S. R. 711.
-(1905) 200 U. S. 527, 50 L. Ed. 581, 26 S. C. R. 301.
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tween the mines upon its mountain sides and the railways in the
valleys below should not be made impossible by the refusal of a
private owner to sell the right to cross his land. The constitution
of the United States does not require us to say that they are
wrong."
Another statute of Utah which permitted a single proprietor
to condemn a right of way for an irrigation ditch across the lands
of others was upheld as a public use by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Clark v. Nash.61 In the course of the
opinion the court said:
7'Whether a statute of a state permitting condemnation by an
individual for the purpose of obtaining water for his land or for
mining should be held to be a condemnation for a public use. and,
therefore, a valid enactment. may depend upon a number of con-
siderations relating to the situation of the state and its possibilities
for land cultivation, or the successful prosecution of its mining
or other industries. Where the use is asserted to be public, and
the right of the individual to condemn for the purpose of exercis-
ing such use is founded upon or is the result of some peculiar con-
dition of the soil or climate, or other peculiarity of the state, where
the right of condemnation is asserted under a state statute, we are
always, where it can fairly be done, strongly inclined to hold with
the state courts, when they uphold a state statute providing for
such condemnation. The validity of such statutes may sometimes
depend upon many different facts, the existence of which would
make a public use. even bv an individual, where, in the absence of
such facts, the use would clearly be private. Those facts must be
general, notorious and acknowledged in the state, and the state
courts may be assumed to be exceptionally familiar with them."
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Fallbrook Irriqation District v. Bradley62 said:
"It is obvious, however, that what is public use frequently and
largely depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the
particular subject-matter in regard to which the character of the
use is questioned. . . On the other hand. in a state like Cali-
fornia which confessedly embraces millions of acres of arid lands.
an act of the legislature providing for their irrigation might well
be regarded as an act devoting the water to a public use. and there-
fore a valid exercise of legislative power. . . The use must be
regarded as a public use or else it would seem to follow that no
general scheme of irrigation can be formed or carried into effect."
In these recent state and federal cases the courts adopt liberal
views of public use and frankly recognize the inadequacy of use
by the public, only, as a universal test. If the other state courts
-(1904) 198 U. S. 361, 49 L. Ed. 1085, 25 S: C. R. 676.
"(1896) 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. Ed. 369, 17 S. C. R. 56.
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will adopt the opinion of the supreme court of Massachusetts sus-
taining the taking of remnants as incidental to the main improve-
ment and the decisions of the supreme courts of the Western
states and the United States upholding a public advantage or bene-
fit as being a public use, then excess condemnation will have a
chance to be held constitutional, and city planning will have gained
a new ally.
The next article will treat city planning and restrictions on the
use of private property.
(To be concluded.)
